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Introduction

2
Public transit systems differ from many other government enterprises in that they charge a fee, or 3 fare, in much the way that private businesses charge for their services. Transit fares are typically 4 of two sorts: flat or differentiated. For decades transportation scholars have argued in favor of 5 flexible, differentiated transit fares, which vary by mode, distance, and/or time-of-day to reflect 6 differences in the marginal costs of service provision (1, 2, 3). Such fare policies, researchers 7 contend, could greatly increase the efficiency, efficacy, and equity of transit service. Research 8 on transit costs suggests that short, off-peak trips tend to be relatively inexpensive to provide, 9 while longer, peak-period trips are more expensive (4). Accordingly, varying fares to reflect 10 these differences in costs would encourage passengers to consume more inexpensive-to-serve 11 trips, and be more judicious in consuming more expensive-to-serve trips, thereby increasing the 12 cost-effectiveness of transit service. risk-taking by organizations is a function of the clarity of agency goals, and public sector goals 25 are often too broad, too vague, or too controversial to evaluate for efficiency and effectiveness
26
(10). Specifically addressing transit pricing, Cervero (11) finds that transit managers must 27 satisfy multiple goals (e.g. capture the cost of service, maximize revenue, reflect the value of 28 service to the user, promote equity, encourage transit use, and redress the underpricing of 29 automobile travel) that combine to make it harder for them to strategically price their services.
30
Nearly all of this research on transit managers' resistance to differentiated fares was 31 conducted prior to the rise of smartcards, which make implementing variable pricing far easier 32 and more reliable than in years past. As smart cards become more ubiquitous, will transit 33 systems gradually reverse course and begin implementing differentiated fares? Will political and 34 institutional resistance to variable pricing hold firm, suggesting that implementation was never Some transit systems divide their service areas into zones and charge higher fares for crossing from one zone to another than for traveling entirely within a given zone. Such system are in effect a crude form of distance pricing. The London transit system is an example of one using zone-based fares.
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decisions that "keep interest groups quiet and mistakes out of the public eye" at the cost of 27 efficiency.
28
But transit managers regularly (albeit reluctantly) raise fares to cover rising costs, often in 29 the face of considerable political outcry, and these fare increases are often viewed as unavoidable 30 and publicly presented as such. Implementing differentiated fares entails similar political 31 resistance as simple fare increases, but with far less certain benefits. Given both their substantial 32 promise to increase operating efficiency and potential to threaten risk-averse decision-makers,
33
our research seeks to better understand the relationships between costs, fares, and risks in the 34 fare policy decision calculus at U.S. transit systems.
36
Methodology
38
Given the enormous challenges that transit agency officials face in delivering efficient and 39 effective transit service while at the same time balancing political risks and scrutiny, we aimed to 40 explore through in-depth interviews and a nationwide survey the following issues:
41 42
 The goals, objectives, principles, and practices that guide the structure and setting of fares To examine these ideas, we conducted two phases of research. The first phase consisted 4 of in-depth interviews with eight officials from four transit agencies about their agencies' 5 marginal costs of providing services, the kinds of information practitioners deem relevant to 6 making fare policy, their levels of risk tolerance, and their rationales for setting fare policies.
7
These interviews allowed us to evaluate the unique context in which transit agencies operate,
8
where they are expected both to operate "like a business" and to simultaneously address a broad 9 range of social goals. We interviewed officials who worked in finance and service planning 10 units who could discuss with us the role that costs (marginal or otherwise) played in decisions 11 about types and levels of service provided, the fares and prices charged, and the share of total
12
(operating and capital) costs that fares should cover. We selected large agencies because they that any "rules of thumb were elusive" and that they "have no good answer."
While this was the general sentiment expressed by most of our interviewees, some 13 reported understanding the structure, level, and variance of service delivery costs. However,
14
even when these were reasonably well understood, one interviewee reported, this information service planning unit of a large transit agency put it bluntly: "We'll never make a cost decision.
6
Service is based on policy decisions, weighing the costs with the number of people served." The 7 independent roles and objectives of departments responsible for finance, fare policy, and service 8 planning in transit agencies often have few incentives for collaboration, which inhibits the flow 9 of information and intra-organizational decision-making.
10
The relatively limited focus on costs in fare setting may be a function of agencies' We also asked interviewees about the factors that they consider when setting fares, specifically. Another said his agency sought to minimize the percentage of costs borne by riders so as to 7 encourage people to ride; they did so by indexing their fares on the consumer price index (CPI) 8 while seeking to maintain existing levels of service. But, according to this manager, constant 9 cost increases make this delicate equilibrium difficult and, ultimately, balancing the budget takes 10 priority. In this case, the substantial recent increase in fare levels at this agency was the result of 11 budgetary crisis, which the interviewee asserted was a relatively more acceptable rationale to the 12 public than any fare change for the sake of increasing economic efficiency.
13
Citing their "large and diverse" service area population, one manager discussed how so- finding underscores the difficulty of capturing multiple goals within a single fare policy.
Loss aversion 1 2
When asked to identify a chain of consequences if their agencies were to implement variable 3 fares reflecting costs, respondents tended to focus more on the riders they expected to lose, rather 4 than the riders they might gain -a commonly reported phenomenon known as loss aversion (21).
5
For example, most reported certainty that they would lose riders from higher-priced expensive-6 to-serve trips, such as among peak period riders traveling long distances, but were at the same 7 time skeptical that inexpensive-to-serve short-distance or off-peak travelers might be attracted by 8 lower fares for those trips. The extent to which ridership would change depends on the urban 9 context, economic conditions, traveler demographics, and so on; with information on these 10 factors the ridership effects of fare structure changes could be estimated, though few agencies 11 have attempted this analysis. Absent such information, therefore, any move to distance-or time-
12
based pricing is a decidedly risky policy pursuit.
13
Transit officials also report that in a world where the cost of driving is artificially low and 14 auto use convenient, transit officials have little choice but to maintain low fares in order to 15 encourage mode shift. Given this unlevel playing field, then, the non-pursuit of marginal cost 16 pricing may be reasonable to expect. But it also suggests that transit officials should support 17 pricing policies such as congestion tolling and parking pricing, which help to internalize the 18 costs of driving. However, as Table 2 shows, transit officials tend to oppose, or are at best Interest in variable pricing of fares is mixed 28 29 Despite the reported practices of setting fares based on reaction to budgetary demands and fiscal 30 crises, creating fare policies that escape public scrutiny, and doing so without clear knowledge of 31 the effects of pricing on riders, there is some -albeit minimal and mixed -interest in variable 32 pricing strategies. Among those agencies that expect to adopt smartcard fare collection 33 technologies in the near future, 55 percent report that they will use the technology to introduce This may be explained by a possible spurious correlation (e.g., some intrinsic difference between 5 late and early adopters explains why late adopters are more interested in variable pricing), or 6 early adopters may still be in stages of implementing smartcards but will -in the near or distant 7 future -use them for variable pricing.
8
Other evidence from our survey shows some (though very minimal) interest. Table 3 Agencies are risk-averse and seek to minimize public scrutiny of any fare changes.
6
The survey results emphasize that transit officials seek to ensure their actions avoid 7 public scrutiny and negative publicity, which substantially inhibits implementing variable cost 8 pricing for two reasons. First, implementing variable fare pricing in almost all cases would be a 9 radical departure from the flat fare status quo, and would thus subject a transit agency to 10 financial scrutiny, heightened media attention, and increased lawmaker inquiry -all of which 11 transit officials report they seek to avoid. Secondly, managers' concerns over the negative 12 consequences of fare changes appear to be so embedded that they report focusing far more on the 13 riders they might lose from any fare changes than the riders they might gain by implementing, 
